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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Appellant Two Jim, Inc. ("Two Jinn") appeals from the district court's order affirming

the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Set Aside Forfeiture and Exonerate Bond
("Motion to Exonerate Bond.")
B.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts
With the following minor exceptions, the State of Idaho agrees with Two Jinn's statement

of the General Course of Proceedings. Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), pgs.
1-3. The State disagrees with Two Jim's assertion that it "lacked any legal recourse to return
Mr. Harris to Idaho involuntarily."

Id.at 2.

The State additionally notes that the hearing before

the magistrate on Two Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond was held on October 31, 2008, rather
than October 11, 2008.

Appellant's Brief, pg. 3; Tr. (10131/08);' R. 140-42.
11.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Did the magistrate abuse his discretion in denying Two Jim's Motion to

Exonerate Bond by determining that justice did not require exoneration of the bond?
B.

Did the magistrate abuse his discretion in denying Two Jim's Motion to

Exonerate Bond by determining that the doctrine of impossibility did not require exoneration of
the bond?

'

The transcript of the October 3 1,2008 hearing is an exhibit to the record in this case,
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ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction

The magistrate appropri~telyexercised his discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to
Exonerate Bond, and t'he district court correctly affirmed the magistrate's well-reasoned decision
on intermediate appeal. As discussed in detail below, the magistrate was within the bounds of
his discretion in concluding that justice did not require exoneration of the bail bond at issue in
this case and that the doctrine of impossibility did not warrant exoneration of the bond.
Accordingly, the State of Idaho respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order upholding the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond.

B.

Standard of Review

This Court recently articulated the applicable standard of review as follows:
"On appeal of a decision rendered by a district court while acting in its
intermediate appellate capacity, this Court directly reviews the district court's
decision." In re Doe, 147 Idaho 243, 207 P.3d 974, 979 (2009). However, to
determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, the Court independently
examineis] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the
magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings." State v. DeWitt, 145
Idaho 709, 71 1, 184 P.3d 215, 217 (Ct. App. 2008). "If those findings are so
supported and the conclusions follow therefrom and if the district court affirmed
the magistrate's decision, we [will] affirm the district court's decision as a matter
of procedure." Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760
(2008) (quoting Nicholls v. Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139
(1 98 1)).
C m m ~v. Bromlev, - P.3d -, 2009 WL 3415745, "1 (Idaho 2009); see also Montgomery v.
Montgomery, 147 Idaho 1, 205 P.3d 650, 654 (2009) ("When this Court reviews a decision
rendered by a district court acting in its appellate capacity, it considers the trial court's
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[magistrate's] decision, and if that decision is free from error and if the district court affirmed
that decision, we affirm the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.")
C.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to
Exonerate Bond by Determining that Justice Did Not Require Exoneration of the
Bond
At the time of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond in this matter, Idaho Criminal Rule

46(e)(412 provided that the trial court could set aside the forfeiture and exonerate the bond "if it
appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement." I.C.R. 46(e)(4). The decision
whether to set aside a forfeiture or exonerate a bond pursuant to Rule 46(e)(4) is within the trial
court's discretion. State v. Rupp, 123 Idaho 1, 3, 843 P.2d 151, 153 (1992); State v. Fry, 128
Idaho 50, 54, 910 P.2d 164, 168 (Ct. App. 1994). As the Idaho Court of Appeals has articulated:

"In Idaho, it has long been held that the 'fixing of bail and release from custody are traditionally
within the discretion of the courts. We believe that these matters are most wisely left to the trial
judge."' &,128 Idaho at 53, 910 P.2d at 167 (quoting State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 541,
700 P.2d 942, 944 (1985)).
A review by this Court of the magistrate's exercise of discretion involves consideration
of whether the magistrate: "(I) perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of this discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific
choices available to it; and (3) reached [his] decision by an exercise of reason."

Shore v.

Peterson, 146 Idaho 903, 915, 204 P.3d 2 124, 1126 (2009). The Idaho courts have recognized
several factors - known as "the
J~ ' F

factors" - that the trial court can consider in reaching its

discretionary determination of whether a bond should be forfeited:
(1) the willfulness of the defendant's violation of bail conditions; (2) the surety's
participation in locating and apprehending the defendant; (3) the costs,
A new version of Rule 46 became effective July I , 2009. However, the prior version of Rule 46 applies
to the case at hand, as Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond in 2008. R. 106-21.
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inconvenience, a i d prejudice suffered by the state as a result of the violation; (4)
any intangible costs; (5) the public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance;
and (6) any mitigating factors.

F~J, 128 Idaho at 54, 910 P.2d at 168; see also State v. Quick Release Bail Bonds, 144 Idaho
651, 655, 167 P.2d 788, 792 (Ct. App. 2007). However, "the

factors are not all-inclusive,"

as "[a] trial court may give weight to other relevant factors." Ouick Release Bail Bonds, 144
Idaho at 655, 167 P.2d at 792.

1.

The Magistrate Appropriately Exercised His Discretion in Denvine Two Jim's
Motion to Exonerate Bond

In the case at hand, the magistrate appropriately exercised his discretion in reaching his
decision to deny Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond. First, the magistrate "perceived the
issue as one of discretion."

Shore, 146 Idaho at 915, 204 P.3d at 1126. The magistrate

specifically noted: "In this case, the Court has some discretion. It is not automatic that a bond
will be forfeited forever. There are certain circumstances where the Court has the ability to set
aside that bond . . . and exonerate it." Tr. (10/31/08), pg. 7, ins. 5-1 1; see also Tr. (5127/09), pg.
14, lns. 13-15.
The magistrate then proceeded to "act[] within the outer boundaries of this discretion and
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to [the
magistrate]," and "reached [his] decision by an exercise of reason." Shore, 146 Idaho at 915,
204 P.3d at 1126; Tr. (10131108), pgs. 4-10. A review of the transcript of the hearing on Two
Jim's Motion to Exonerate Bond reveals that the magistrate's decision was well-reasoned and
involved consideration of the

factors: the willfulness of the Defendant's violation of bail

conditions, (Tr. (1013 1/08), pg. 4, in. 19 - pg. 5, In. 21); the surety's participation in locating and
apprehending the defendant, (& at pg. 4, ins. 7-12); inconvenience suffered by the state as a
result of the violation, (& at pg. 4, Ins. 13-14); intangible costs,
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(id. at pg. 7, Ins.

12-17); the

public's interest in ensuring a defendant's appearance in court,

(aat pg. 5, Ins. 11-21; pg. 7, In.

Id.at pg. 8, Ins.

10-19; see also Tr. (5127109), pg.

14 - pg. 8, In. 9); and any mitigating factors.

14, In. 12 - pg. 16, In. 10; &, 128 Idaho at 54, 910 P.2d at 168. Substantial and competent
evidence supported the magistrate's findings of fact, and the magistrate's conclusions of law
followed from those findings of fact.

m,

- P.3d -,

2009 WL 3415745, * I .

Two Jinn, however, attempts to attack the magistrate's well-reasoned decision with three
general arguments: ( I ) Two Jinn asserts that the magistrate "applied the incorrect legal
standard;" (2) Two Jinn argues that "both the magistrate and the district court erroneously
believed that Two Jinn could request extradition" of the defendant, Aaron Harris, from Oregon;
and (3) Two Jinn asserts that the magistrate failed to recognize the purpose of bail by finding that
exoneration of the bond was not warranted. Appellant's Brief, pgs. 6-10. Each of these
arguments is addressed below.
2.

The Magistrate Applied the Correct Legal Standard

As noted above, Two Jinn first argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying
Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond because, according to Two Jinn, the magistrate "applied
the incorrect legal standard." Appellant's Briec pg. 6. Specifically, Two Jinn argues that the
magistrate "denied Two Jinn's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed to demonstrate that
'it would . . . not be just to let the forfeiture stand,"' which Two Jinn asserts was the ''incorrect
legal standard."
a.

Id.at 6-7 (quoting Tr. (1013 112008), pg. 9, ins. 4-5).
Two Jinn Failed to Raise This Issue Below

This argument first fails because it was not raised before the district court below.
. ~ is well settled that when a second
Appellant's 3123109 Brief; Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply ~ r i e f "It

'

Appellant's 3/23/09 Brief and Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply Brief are exhibits to the record in this appeal.
See R. 182.
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appeal is taken, the appellants may not raise issues in the higher court different from those
presented in the intermediate court." Centers v. Yehezkelv, 109 Idaho 216, 217, 706 P.2d 105,
106 (Ct. App. 1985). "Generally, 'an issue presented on appeal must have been properly framed
and preserved in the court below.' It follows that after an intermediate appeal, issues not raised in
the intermediate court will not be addressed in the higher court." Wood v. Wood, 124 Idaho 12,
16-17, 855 P.2d 473, 477-78 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Centers, 109 Idaho at 217, 706 P.2d at
106); see also Cooper v. Bd. of Prof I Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 134 Idaho 449,456,
4 P.3d 561, 568 (2000). Two Jinn did not argue, in its intermediate appeal before the district
court, that the magistrate had "applied the incorrect legal standard" in reaching his discretionary
Appellant's 3123109 Brief; Appellant's 5/8/09 Reply Brief. Because this

determination.

particular argument was not "properly framed and preserved in the court below," it should not be
addressed by this Court.

m,124 Idaho at 16-17, 855 P.2d at 477-78 (quoting Centers, 109

Idaho at 217, 706 P.2d at 106).
b.

The Magistrate Applied the Correct Standard

Regardless, however, the magistrate's determination was consistent with applicable legal
standards. Two Jinn's argunlent is based upon semantics rather than substance: Two Jinn claims
that the magistrate "denied Two Jim's motion because it concluded Two Jinn failed to
~ compared to Rule
demonstrate that 'it would . . . not be just to let the forfeiture ~ t a n d , " ' as
The magistrate's actual comments were as follows:
I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling to return to Oregon [sic] and the
mere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon creates a legal impossibility such
that it would be - not be just to let the forfeiture stand.

Tr. (10/31/08),pg. 9, Ins. 1-5
And I don't find that because they have placed themselves in that situation, in this particular
case, that it makes it unjust to . . . not forfeit the bond.
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46(e)(4)'s language, which provided that the trial court could set aside the forfeiture and
exonerate the bond 'if it appears that justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement."'
Appellant's Brief, pgs. 6-7 (quoting I.C.R. 46(e)(4)); Tr. (10131108), pg. 9 ins. 4-5.)

The

magistrate's consideration of whether "it would be unjust to allow the bond to remain forfeited"
is the same as whether "justice does not require a forfeiture's enforcement." Tr. (10/31108), pg.
7, ins. 9-10; I.C.R. 46(e)(4). When considering this issue, the trial court can reach one of two
conclusions; either: (I) justice requires the forfeiture's enforcement; or (2) justice does not
require the forfeiture's enforcement, which would therefore render enforcement of the forfeiture
"unjust." The magistrate's consideration of whether allowing the bond to remain forfeited would
be unjust was the correct legal standard, and the magistrate did not act inconsistently with
applicable legal standards.
3.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Consideri~lgWhether Two Jinn
Demonstrated that it Had Taken Steps to Seek Extradition

Two Jinn additionally argues that the magistrate abused his discretion in denying Two
Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond because, according to Two Jinn, the magistrate "erroneously
believed that Two Jinn could request extradition." Appellant's Brief, pg. 7. Two Jinn's assertion
overstates the magistrate's holding, which was as follows:
I do not find that the mere fact that the defendant is unwilling to return to Oregon
[sic] and the mere possible threat of being charged with a crime in Oregon creates
a legal impossibility such that it would be -not be just to let the forfeiture stand.
There are ways to secure the attendance in the State of Idaho of somebody who's
charged with a misdemeanor. There's nothing before me that anybody has ever
taken any of those steps. You can invoke the extradition powers of the states on a
misdemeanor, as well. It is very rarely done. But here there's been no efforts by
anybody that I have seen to try and invoke that process to see if Mr. Harris can be
brought back through the cooperative efforts of the Governor's Office of the State
of Idaho and the Governor's Office of the State of Oregon.
Id. at
-

10, Ins. 15-18.
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Tr. (10131108), pg. 9, Ins. 1-15 (emphasis added).
The magistrate never held that Two Jinn itself "could request extradition" from the
Governor's Office of the State of Oregon.

id. Instead, the magistrate merely noted that there

was no evidence from Two Jinn that either Two Jinn or anybody else had taken any steps to "try
and invoke the process."

at pg. 9, in. 12. Indeed, as discussed at oral argument during the

intermediate appeal before the district court, there was no evidence that Two Jinn took any
measures to request that the Prosecutor's Office seek extradition of Mr. ~ a r r i s . '

Tr.

(5127109), pgs. 9-13. In fact, Two Jinn did not even notify the prosecuting attorney that it had
discovered Mr. Harris in Oregon; the first time Two Jinn disclosed the information was through
its filing of its Motion to Exonerate Bond.

Id. at

pg. 9, Ins. 1-10. Thus, Two Jinn sought

exoneration of the bond without having even taken prior steps to notify the Prosecutor's Office
of its knowledge of Mr. Harris's whereabouts.

Id.

Two Jinn has argued that "[tlhe magistrate . . . incorrectly weighed the state's failure to
seek Mr. I-Iarris's extradition against Two Jinn instead of applying that factor in its favor."
Appellant's Brief, pg. 10. While the Idaho courts have, indeed, held that a trial court can
consider the state's interest in extraditing the defendant when reaching its discretionary
determination regarding the exoneration of a bond, the magistrate's conclusion was within the
bounds of his discretion.

It was not an abuse of discretion for the magistrate to consider the

Pursuant to Idaho Code 5 19-4523(2), the prosecuting attorney can apply to the Governor of Idaho for
extradition to Idaho of an individual who has violated his bail or probation. If the prosecuting attorney
has no knowledge that the individual has fled the State of Idaho, however, then clearly such an
application will not be made. As the State's attorney noted before the district court in this matter: "[Iln
this case I think that the bonding company, if they did have . . . an extraordinary circumstance in this case,
that being that the defendant was located in Oregon, a state where they're unable to bring him back, at
that point finding him there, perhaps it would've been on the bonding company that at that time indicate
that they'd found him in a place where they couldn't bring him back to Idaho, and at that point then make
the request for that warrant of extradition . . .." Tr. (5/27109), pg. 9, In. 16 - pg. 10, in. 1.
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 8

potential mitigating factor of the difficulty of extradition and to reach a well-reasoned rejection
of that excuse, based in part upon Two Jinn's lack of any efforts to try to invoke the extradition
process through the means available to Two Jinn, such as timely notification of the prosecutor
andlor requesting that the prosecutor apply to the Governor for extradition.

Tr. (1013 1/08),

pg. 9, Ins. 1-15; Tr. (5/27/09), pgs. 9-13.
In addition to its consideration of Two Jinn's lack of action in requesting extradition, the
Court also considered Two Jinn's assumption of risks and obligation to secure the defendant's
presence in court. As discussed in more detail below, this appropriate focus on the surely's risks
and obligations further supported the magistrate's conclusion that justice did not require
exoneration of the bond, despite Mr. Harris's presence in Oregon

4.

The Mapistrate Appropriately Considered the Underlying Purpose of
Bail Bonds

Two Jinn's final argument with respect to the magistrate's alleged abuse of discretion in
determining that justice did not require exoneration of the bond is that the magistrate "failed to
recognize the policies underlying relief from forfeiture, including fulfilling bail's purpose by
providing the surety a financial incentive to locate absconding defendants." Appellant's Brief,
pg. 10. The State disagrees that the purpose of a bail bond is to provide a surety with a financial
incentive to locate a fugitive. Taking a photograph of the fugitive in another state does not
effectuate the purpose of securing the defendant's presence in court. To the extent that the bail
bond is intended to provide an incentive for any behavior on the part of the surety, it is instead
intended to encourage the surety to return the defendant himself to court. Two Jinn predicts that
if the Court rules against it in this case, "bail agents such as Two Jinn will no longer undertake
the expense to find defendants who have fled Idaho - particularly those who have fled to
neighboring Oregon . . .." Appellant's Brief, pg. 10. In other words, Two Jinn will not longer
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locate a defendant, fail to inform the prosecution or any entity that can actually extradite the
defendant, and then demand that the trial court exonerate the bond for its extraordinary efforts in
having failed to accomplish the primary purpose of the bond: to return the defendant to court
Two Jinn suggests that the magistrate failed to focus on the appropriate policy reasons
andlor purposes underlying bail bonds. To the contrary, the magistrate appropriately considered
the primary purpose of bail bonds, which Two Jinn itself recognized: "to effectuate the accused's
appearance in court," and appropriately focused on Two Jim's assunption of risks and
obligations under the bond contract.

Id.at 8 (citing to Quick Release Bail Bonds,

144 Idaho at

The magistrate reasoned:
Here, however, what I find is that the bonding company took a risk. They're in
the business of posting surety bonds to ensure that people appear at future court
appearances.
I have no evidence of what efforts, if any, the bonding company may have done
or taken to secure or to ensure that their client was not going to fly the coop. Was
going to cooperate as far as appearing at all of their court appearances.
That is exactly why we have a surety bond arrangement. And so that there is
some guarantee that a person is going to appear at all of their court appearances.
That is the exact obligation that the bonding company assumes when they post a
surety bond for a criminal defendant.
Obviously, no bonding company isFgoing to assume the total responsibility for
supervising the client 24 hours a day, seven days a week to make sure that they
don't do anything silly. But they do have an obligation to bring that person to the
court. And the bonding company failed in that obligation.
They now claim that it's impossible because they may face criminal prosecution
in another state. And while that may occur, that, too, is a risk that the bonding
company takes when they bond somebody out and they're going to do business in
this particular geographical region. If somebody is going to flee the area, whether
it is to Oregon, or Alaska, or Northern Ireland, or wherever[,] a person may
decide that they don't [want] to come back. In which case there are some
practical difficulties and some legal difficulties.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL - 10

But that is not tlie responsibility or obligation of the State of Idaho or of the
Public Defender appointed to represent Mr. Harris. That is the commercial
responsibility of the surety bond company.
Tr. (10/31108), pg. 7, In. 14 - pg. 8, in. 23.
While the exact issue presented in this case does not appear to have been previously
examined by the Idaho courts, the magistrate's reasoning was in accordance with many other
jurisdictions that have addressed similar scenarios. In fact, the United States Supreine Court has
long held that a surety should not be automatically relieved of its obligations simply because the
defendant flees tlie jurisdiction:
When bail is given, the principal is regarded as delivered to the custody of his
sureties. Their dominion is a continuance of the original imprisonment. Whenever
they choose to do so, they may seize him and deliver him up in their discharge;
and if that cannot be done at once, they may imprison him until it can be done.
They may exercise their rights in person or by agent. They may pursue him into
another State; may arrest him on the Sabbath; and, if necessary, may break and
enter his house for that purpose. The seizure is not made by virtue of new process.
None is needed. It is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.
In 6 Modem it is said: 'The bail have their principal on a string, and may pull the
string whenever they please, and render him in their discharge.' . . . They may
doubtless permit him to go beyond the limits of the State within which he is
to answer, but it is unwise and imprudent to do so; and if any evil ensue, they
must bear the burden of the consequences, and cannot cast them upon the
obligee.

In the case of Devine v. The State, the court, speaking of the principal, say, 'The
sureties had the control of his person; they were bound at their peril to keep
him within their jurisdiction, and to have his person ready to surrender
when demanded. . . . In the case before us, the failure of the sureties to
surrender their principal, was, in the view of the taw, the result of their own
negligence or connivance, in suffering their principal to go beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and from under their control.'
Tavlor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872) (emphasis added).

A bail bond is a three-party contract between the state, the accused, and the
surety, whereby the surety guarantees appearance of the accused. The risk of a
defendant not appearing is borne by the surety and the surety, in order to protect
its interest, must take precautionary actions to prevent this type of situation. . . .
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apprehend and produce appellant for trial as the bond obligated it to do were
immaterial to the matter of forfeiting the bond and the rendition of a judgment
against the surety for the penalty of it.
State v. Honey, 86 N.W.2d 187, 189-90 (Neb.1957) (emphasis added).
Similarly, another court held:
She contends that her principal was prevented from making his appearance in the
Court below by reason of the failure of North Carolina, the obligee, to assert
its right to his custody. The position is untenable. Upon the execution of the
bail bond, William Dudley Pelley was delivered into the custody of his sureties.
The very purpose of the bond was not to enrich the treasury of Buncombe
County, but to make the sureties responsible for the appearance of the
defendant at the proper time. In the case of United States v. Marrin, supra, the
defendant was released on a bail bond for his appearance in the District Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. While Marrin was out
on bond he went to New York, where he was arrested, convicted upon charges of
forgery and grand larceny and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of fifteen
years in Sing Sing. The surety on the bail bond in Pennsylvania raised the same
question as to the duty of the United States Court to have requested the custody of
the principal. The Court said: "Though the United States attorney was present at
the hearing, his failure to request Manin's release was no such act of the obligee
as to relieve the surety, because non constat that the request would have been
granted by the court. It was Marrin's own act in going into that jurisdiction that
rendered his appearance impossible. O u r attention has not been called to any
case holding that under any circumstances the prosecuting attorney of a
district in which the recognizance runs is required to make an effort to
secure the removal o r release of an alleged criminal arrested in another
jurisdiction. He may do so, but he is not required to act. The recognizance is
taken to secure that very result. Its condition is absolute in this regard, and, in our
judgment, it would be a very dangerous innovation to require the government
to not only see to it that responsible bail is secured, but, in addition, require
it to keep its prosecuting officers in readiness to appear in other and distant
jurisdictions to aid the principal in the recognizance to extricate himself from
an arrest from which alone the latter is to blame."
State

V.

Pellev, 24 S.E.2d 635, 638 (N.C. 1943) (quoting United States v. Marrin, 170 F. 476

(E.D. Pa. 1909)); see also County of Los Angeies v. Ranger Ins. Co., 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 28 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996) ("Cuba was just one of many places which defendant could flee to and be
immune from surety's agents. Such risks were present when surety posted bond. Respondent did
not act to increase those risks.")
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Two J i m further suggests that the magistrate abused his discretion in focusing on the
risks assumed by Two Jinn under the bond agreement, as the magistrate concluded that justice
did not require forfeiture of the bond on the mere basis that "the bonding company hadn't
secured enough collateral, or co-signers, or any other security regarding the obligations," noting:
"[Tlhat's the bond company's responsibility. That's their obligation," and "if the bonding
company malces the decision that they have not adequately secured the bond, that's their risk."
Tr. (10131/08), pg. 10, ins. 7-14. This conclusion on the part of the magistrate was well within
the bounds of his discretion. The magistrate focused on the very terms of the contract to which
Two Jinn contractually agreed; to suggest that it was an abuse of discretion for him to do so is
untenable. Indeed, other courts have come to the same appropriate conclusion as the magistrate
in this case:
The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a bail surety. It is precisely
the situation which a surety guarantees against. Appellant insured the risk by
securing property of the defendant. The fact that appellant is now unable to
deliver the defendant or fully collect on his collateral will not shift the risk to
the obligee. We hold, therefore, that it is an insufficient defense in a bond
forfeiture proceeding that appellant is unable to produce the defendant due
to foreign policy decisions when the defendant voluntarily fled the country
prior to his initial court appearance date.

State v. Obayon, 467 N.E.2d 908,911-12 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (emphasis added).
"Sureties know and solemnly contract that the defendant shall appear and abide
the orders of the court and in the event of his default are bound by their
obligation. . . . If sureties, who have it in their power to insure compliance by
a defendant, may he relieved because they make diligent effort for his arrest
as a fugitive there exists little inducement for diligence on their part in the
first instance to prevent his escape. T o exonerate sureties for such reason
would seriously impede the declared public policy of the State for the
prevention and punishment of crime. . . ."
Otller reasons for denying relief to the surety are these: . . . the removal of the
principal to Oklahoma and his falling into the toils of the law of that state are the
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Surety's inability to perform its obligation is due to its own fault in permitting
the defendant to leave the State. . ..
Alleghenv Cas. Co. v. State, 850 So.2d 669, 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).
Two Jinn's suggestion that the magistrate's decision ignores the underlying purpose of
bail bands because the "refus[al] to exonerate the bond in these circumstances rewards the state's
lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris with a windfall of the forfeiture funds in its treasury" is
untenable. Appellant's Brief, pg. 8. First, as discussed previously, there is no indication in the
record that the state displayed a "lack of interest in extraditing Mr. Harris," as Two Jinn never
requested that the state pursue extradition, and as the state was not even aware of Mr. I-Iarris's
presence in Oregon until after Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate. &e

id.; Tr. (5/27/09),

pgs. 9-13. Regardless, however, it was not an abuse of the magistrate's discretion for him to
focus on Two Jinn's contractual obligations and assumed risks with respect to the bail bond,
rather than shifting his focus to the alleged actions of a third party
As a Nebraska court articulated in a similar situation:
It was not important that Nebraska officers did not assist the surety in its
attempt to secure the return of appellant. They had no duty to do so. Their
refusal was not an interference with or an obstacle to the performance of the
obligation of the surety as provided in the bond.

. . . It is stated in United States v. Marrin, D.C., 170 F. 476-478: 'It is contended
his failure to appear resulted from the failure of the United States district attorney
to urge Judge Chatfield to release him. Upon entering into the recognizance
Marrin was delivered into the custody of his surety, who was thereafter
responsible for his appearance. Upon this contract the government had a right
to rely, and it is not required to go out of the jurisdiction in which the
recognizance was given to help the cognizor to extricate himself from a
situation in which he of his own motion became entangled.'
The responsibility to have appellant in court when his presence was required
was solely that of the surety. The essence of the complaint of the surety is that
the officers did not do or assist in doing what the bond required of the surety.
There is no showing that the officers or the State did anything to interfere with
performance by the surety. The facts in reference to the efforts of the surety to
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result of defendant's own voluntary act; the surety is at fault for permitting
him to go into another jurisdiction, instead of keeping him under its control
State v. Harmnond, 426 S.W.2d 84, 87 (Mo. 1968) (quoting State v. Hinoiosa, 271 S.W.2d 522,
t v Resolute Ins. Co., 493 P.2d 731, 733 (Or. Ct. App.
524 (Mo 1954)); see also ~ m a t i l l a ~ o u n v.
1972) ("The state is not the surety's surety. We have not been cited to any provision . . . that
says that the surety shall not be answerable on its bond unless the state takes some positive
action to insure that the surety's principals will meet their unqualified obligation to appear at the
appointed time.")
Two Jinn additionally argues that "public policy disfavors forfeitures."

Appellant's

Brief, pg. 4. The Idaho law cited by Two Jinn on this point holds only that a magistrate's
decision not to forfeit a bond was within his discretion and "consistent with the policy
disfavoring forfeitures." State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 117-18, 952 P.2d
1249, 1253-54 (Ct. App. 1998).

Equally (if not more) compelling is the public policy

disfavoring a defendant's failure to appear in court, which is the primary purpose underlying a
bail bond contract, as well as the public policy favoring the enforcement of contractual
obligations, such as Two Jinn's contractual obligation to effectuate the defendant's appearance in
court. See, ex., Burlev Newspapers, Inc. v. Mist Pub. Co., 90 Idaho 515, 414 P.2d 460, 462-63
(1966) ("It would be both inequitable and against public policy of this state to permit one party
to a contract, voluntarily made, to seek relief from an executed contract after receiving the
benefits thereunder and not permit the other party similarly to enforce the contractual
obligations."); Steams v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 283, 240 P.2d 833, 837 (1952) ("An
agreement voluntarily made between competent persons is not lightly to be set aside on the
grounds of public policy, or because it turned out unfortunately for one party."); Marshall v.
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Covington, 81 Idaho 199, 205, 359 P.2d 504, 507 (1959) ("We do not so far forget that the usual
and most important function of courts of justice is rather to maintain and enforce contracts than
to enable parties thereto to escape their obligation on the pretext of public policy . . ..") (quoting
Granger v. Craven, 199 N.W. 10, 1 1 (Mim. 1924))
In sum, as one court aptly articulated: "The purpose of a hail bond is to have the
principal appear at a prescribed time. The fact that his presence may subsequently be
obtained through extradition cannot eliminate the prejudice to the state which must he presumed
as a result of the delay in bringing him to trial. Since the surety failed to perform its obligation,
it must be held liable upon its undertaking." Pinellas Countv v. Robertson, 490 So.2d 1041,
1043 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986) (emphasis added).

The magistrate appropriately considered the

underlying purpose of bail bonds and reached a well-reasoned decision well within the bounds of
his discretion.
D.

The Magistrate Did Not Abuse His Discretion in Denying Two Jinn's Motion to
Exonerate Bond by Concluding that the Doctrine of Impossibility Did Not Require
Exoneration
Two Jinn additionally argues that "because Oregon law and the state's lack of interest in

prosecuting Mr. Hanis made it impossible for Two Jinn to bring him before the court, the
doctrine of impossibility should excuse Two Jinn's performance under the bail bond agreement."
Appellant's Brief, pg. 1 1.
As this Court has stated: "[Tlhe doctrine of impossibility operates to excuse performance
when the bargained-for perfonnance is no longer in existence or is no longer capable of being
performed due to the unforeseen, supervening act of a third party." I-Iaessly v. Safeco Title Ins.
Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463,465,825 P. 2d 1 119, 1 121 (1992).
Impossibility is proven by showing that a contingency occurred, the
nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the agreement, and that the
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contingency made performance of the contract impossible. It is not sufficient to
show that the performance simply became more difficult or Inore expensive than
anticipated-it inust have been made impossible. Most iniportantly, it is the task
itself which must be impossible-it is not enough that the particular promisor is
unable to perform the task if it would be possible for a different promisor to
perform.
State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 523, 198 P.3d 749, 752 (Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations
omitted).
Two Jinn's attempt to rely upon the doctrine of impossibility fails on several fronts.
First, the contingency of Mr. Harris fleeing the jurisdiction cannot be deemed an "unforeseen,
supervening act;" nor has Two Jinn demonstrated that Mr. Harris's continued presence in Idaho
"was a basic assumption of the [bond] agreement."

m,121 Idaho at 465, 825 P. 2d at 1121

(emphasis added); Chacon, 146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752. There is no evidence on the
record that Two Jinn's obligations to ensure Mr. Harris's appearance in court were only valid so
long as Mr. Harris remained in Idaho. Likewise, a criminal defendant's decision to flee to
another state or country is hardly an "unforeseeable" event, but is instead exactly the type of risk
that a bonding company assumes and insures against to guarantee the defendant's appearance in
court. See Ohavon, 467 N.E.2d at 91 1 ("The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a bail
surety.") In the case at hand, Mr. Harris had a history of disappearing, as he failed to appear for
at least four court appearances and for a sheriffs work program. R. 2, 4-5, 44, 77-78, 95-96,
103-04. His act of leaving the jurisdiction was not "unforeseeable."
To the extent Two J i m is arguing that "an essential component of its performance is the
state's continued desire to prosecute the defendant," Two J i m similarly cannot demonstrate that
this "was a basic assumption of the [bond] agreement." Appellant's Brief, pg. 13; Chacon, 146
Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752. "[IJt would be a very dangerous innovation to require the
government to not only see to it that responsible bail is secured, but, in addition, require it to
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keep its prosecuting officers in readiness to appear in other and distant jurisdictions to aid the
principal in the recognizance to extricate himself from [circumstances] from which alone the
latter is to blame."

w,
24 S.E.2d at 638. Two Jinn cannot demonstrate that its obligations

under the bond agreement were only enforceable so long as the state unequivocally continued to
seek prosecution of the defendant, regardless of the circumstances. Regardless, there is no
evidence in the record that the state was suddenly not interested in sentencing Mr. Harris on his
parole violation; if Mr. Harris were to appear in court, as Two Jinn was required to ensure, the
state would undoubtedly be very interested in continuing its prosecution of the defendant.
Furthermore, as discussed previously, Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond before the
state was even made aware of the fact that Mr. Harris had left Idaho, which undermines its
argument that the state somehow failed to pursue extradition within the 180 day period following
forfeiture of the bond.6

Appellant's Brief, pg. 12.

Another reason why Two Jinn's impossibility defense fails is the fact that the obligation
at issue - securing Mr. Harris's appearance in court - is not impossible for anyone to perform.
"[l]t is the task itself which must be impossible - it is not enough that the particular pro~nisor
[Two Jinn] is unable to perform the task if it would be possible for a different promisor to
perform."

m,146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (emphasis added).

Two Jinn recognizes

this requirement of the doctrine of impossibility, but argues that "[alny bail agent would be

Two Jinn argues that "Idaho Criminal Rule 46(g) directs the court to exonerate the bond if the
defendant is brought before the cou~twithin 180 days following forfeiture. . . . The state had not requested
an extraditable warrant that would have permitted Oregon law enforcement to arrest Mr. Narris at Two
Jinn's request." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12. Forfeiture of the bond occurred on February 5,2008. R. 10405. The state did not become aware of the fact that Mr. Harris had moved to The Dalles, Oregon until
Two Jinn filed its Motion to Exonerate Bond on August I, 2008. Tr. (5127109), pg. 9; Appellant's Brief,
pg. 8. Not surprisingly, given its lack of knowledge that Mr. Narris had left Idaho, the state "had not
requested an extraditable warrant" prior to August 1, 2008. Notably, this was only three days before the
expiration of the 180-day period following forfeiture, which would not have allowed sufficient time for
R. 104-05.
extradition within that time period, anyway.
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similarly unable to perform and, thus, the impossibility was not personal to Two Jinn."
Appellant's Brief., pgs. 12-13. The standard is not whether another bail agent would be able to
perform the task, but whether "it would be possible for a different promisor to perform." Chacon,
146 Idaho at 523, 198 P.3d at 752 (holding that "[Chacon] does not suggest that it was
impossible for anyone to [perform the obligation under the contract]. Therefore, the doctrine of
impossibility does not operate to excuse Chacon's nonperformance.") (emphasis added). The
task itself - securing Mr. Harris's appearance in court in Idaho - is not in and of itself impossible
for anyone to perform.
Two Jinn's argument of impossibility is further undermined because Two Jinn failed to
demonstrate that it had taken any steps to request that the prosecuting attorney apply for
extradition. See Tr. (5/27/09), pgs. 9-13. "It is not sufficient to show that the performance
simply became more difficult or more expensive than anticipated," such as having to take
measures to request extradition; "it must have been made impossible." Chacon, 146 Idaho at
523, 198 P.3d at 752 (emphasis added).
Finally, Two Jinn's argument fails because the circumstances at issue were created by the
voluntary actions of the defendant, Mr. Harris, in fleeing the state, as well as Two Jinn's own
actions in failing to prevent Mr. I-Iarris from leaving the jurisdiction.

Curlycan Bail Bonds,

Inc. v. State, 933 So.2d 122, 123 (Fla. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the bonding company's
impossibility defense and holding: "Here, it was also a combination of Fonseca's voluntary
action in fleeing to Venezuela and Curlycan's failure to take precautionary action to prevent his
leaving the jurisdiction which led to the surety's inability to perform its obligation under the
bond. Curlycan is therefore not entitled to be relieved of the monetary obligation it contractually
assumed.") The United States Supreme Court has loilg held that the defense of impossibility is
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not available when the surety's obligation is rendered impossihle by the acts of the surety or the
defendantiprincipal. Taylor, 83 U.S. at 370. "The principal in the case before us, cannot be
allowed to avail himself of an impossibility of performance thus created; and what will not avail
him cannot avail his sureties. His contract is identical with theirs. They undertook for him what
he undertook for himself."

Id.at 374.

Even in situations where the "impossihility" of extraditing the defendant is more
pronounced, courts in various jurisdictions have rejected the argument that performance under a
bail bond agreement should he excused by the doctrine of impossihility. In Professional Bail
Bonds. Inc. v. State, for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed a situation where the
defendant had voluntarily fled to I-Ionduras, which lacked an extradition treaty with the United
States. The court nevertheless rejected tlie impossihility defense, holding:
We reject appellant's contention that the circuit court should have stricken
forfeiture of the bonds because it was impossihle to produce tlie defendants. The
purpose of a bail bond system is to insure that the party accused is present at
trial. Judge Wenner expounded upon the inefficacy of an argument based on
impossibility under circumstances wherein the surety has expressly assumed just
such a risk. We note that in the typical contract case, the promisor may not rely
on the defense of "impossihility" as an excuse for non-performance if the
promisor assumed the risk.

. . . . The defendants voluntarily fled the country. Appellant insured against
that flight, and must now suffer the consequence. . . .

The escape of a defendant is the business risk of a hail surety. It is precisely
the situation which a surety guarantees against. . . .

. . . In the instant case, . . . [tlhe Defendant voluntarily fled the country and did not
appear in Court as required. For diplomatic reasons, i.e., lack of an extradition
treaty with Honduras, the Defendant cannot be returned to the United States. . . .
This Court finds that . . . the Petitioner in this case "assumed the risk" that the
Defendant would not appear at trial. Petitioner's good faith attempts to locate the
Defendant are no defense to Petitioner's failure to appear. It is an insufficient
defense that Petitioner is unable to produce the defendant due to the lack of
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an extradition treaty with Honduras when the defendant voluntarily fled the
country prior to his initial court appearance date.
Professional Bail Bonds, Inc. v. State, 968 A.2d 1136, 1147-49 (Md. Ct. App. 2009) (some
emphasis added) (some emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted);
also State v. Phayon, 467 N.E.2d 908 (Ohio
-

1983) (rejecting the surety's petition to have the

bond forfeiture stricken despite the fact that the defendant had absconded to Israel and refused to
return to Ohio and the fact that the United Stales declined to press Israel for extradition.)
The Florida Court of Appeals rejected the defense of impossibility where a defendant fled
to Georgia and was shot and killed by a law enforcement officer. State v. Sunshine State Bail
Bonds, Inc., 967 So.2d 1084, 1084 (Fla. Ct. App. 2007). Despite the defendant's death, the court
ordered that the bond forfeiture remain in place, holding that "the doctrine of impossibility of
performance does not excuse Sunshine State Bail Bonds of its obligation to take precautionary
action to prevent Vilpre from leaving the jurisdiction, even though the actions of a third party
prevented it from bringing Vilpre back to the jurisdiction." & at 1085,
Many jurisdictions have also held that where a surety cannot secure a defendant's
presence in court because the defendant has been incarcerated in another state, the surety
nevertheless cannot rely upon the doctrine of impossibility, as the Idaho courts have recognized:
The first line of authority, that incarceration i n another jurisdiction does not
provide a valid excuse to avoid bond forfeiture, began with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Taylor v. Taintor,83 US.366, 21 L.Ed 287 (1872).
In Taylor, the Court ruled, "It is the willing act of the [the defendant] which
creates the obstacle, and the legal effect is the same as of any other act of his,
which puts performance out of his power." Id. at 370, 21 L.Ed 287. Thus, a
surety had no claim for avoiding the forfeiture of bond because "what will not
avail [the defendant] cannot avail his sureties." Id. at 374, 21 L.Ed. 287. More
recent cases have followed this line of reasoning. In State v. Fields, 137
N.J.Super. 76, 347 A.2d 810 (Ct.App.Div.1975), the New Jersey court stated that
the "mere fact that defendant is imprisoned in Florida is not sufficient to relieve
the forfeiture in whole or in part, especially if he left New Jersey without
permission, or is jailed for a new crime." Id., 347 A.2d at 81 1. Likewise, an
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Alabama appellate court has held, "The rule is well established that the
incarceration in another state of the principal in a bail bond arrangement made in
this state does not relieve the sureties on that bond of their obligation to produce
the principal at the appointed place and time in Alabama." Johnson v. State, 401
So.2d '1 18, 1 18-19 (Ala.Civ.App.1981).
&y, 128 Idaho at 52, 910 P.2d at 166. In &y, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that incarceration

in another state does not automatically lead to exoneration of a bond, but is instead a factor to be
considered by the trial court in reaching its discretionary decision whether exoneration is
warranted.

Id.

It logically follows that if something as extreme as incarceration in another state

does not lead to automatic exoneration of the bond, then mere voluntary refusal to return from
another state and difficulty with extradition similarly do not lead to automatic exoneration on the
basis of "impossibility."
The magistrate was well within the bounds of his discretion in concluding that the
doctrine of impossibility did not warrant exoneration of the bond under these circumstances
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IV.

CONCLUSION
The magistrate appropriately exercised his discretion in denying Two Jinn's Motion to
Exonerate Bond. Substantial and competent evidence in the record supported the magistrate's
findings of fact, and his conclusions of law followed from those findings. Crump,
2009 WL 3415745, * I .

P.3d -,

Accordingly, the State respectfully requests that this Court uphold the

district court's affirmation of the magistrate's denial of Two Jinn's Motion to Exonerate Bond.
See id.
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